effect that Great Britain was negotiating a separate peace with Germany.
It was a manifestation of the Soviet's hostility towards the British and,
in particular., to Eden, whose role in the Polish Statement had been widely
discussed in the Press.
London's Daily Worker gave its explanation of the move, pointing out
that the most touchy problem of ail was the Polish question :
" But it remains a mystery/' wrote the Daily Worker, " why the British
Government should have permitted itself to be manoeuvred by the Polish
emigres into a position in which it appeared that, however indirectly—by
the suggestion of mediation—the British and American Governments were
in a loose sense e going along with J the Polish emigres in the policy expressed
by the Polish announcement. The British Government can certainly have
been in no doubt as to the attitude of the Soviet Government towards
outside attempts at interference in the Polish-Soviet affair.*'
To all British and American proposals of mediation in the Polish-
Russian dispute, the Kremlin had given a blunt refusal, declaring, on
January 25, that " conditions have not yet ripened to a point at which
advantage could be taken of this offer.'* The Soviet Press commented
on these offers of mediation almost as if they were an offence. Stalin
simply dictated terms " demanding Poland's surrender^ and from Britain
and America their agreement on the partition of that country."*
Might was to decide ! Already this idea had been proclaimed in the
Soviet Press. Pravda and War and the Working Class came out with the
statement that " owing to Russia's weakness in 1918, they lost the Baltic
States, but at present, Soviet Russia is so powerful that she simply takes
them back." A statement such as this was very far from the ideas
expressed in the Atlantic Charter. The Kremlin explained its policy by
pushing forward two principles. First Russia claimed that she alone had
the right to settle her relations with her neighbours without the inter-
vention of the other Allies, a statement which meant nothing less than that
the problems of the countries between Russia and Germany were not
international.! Secondly that in the countries concerned, < friendly'
governments must be formed. Yet, even while in the act of putting for-
* Associated Press, July 19th, 1944.
f At the first opportunity. Soviet propaganda made the Kremlin's outlook
over the affair of its neighbouring countries quite clear. The victim of this
explanation was Wendell Wilkie, the United States Republican Party leader who,
in the New York Times, had raised the issue of the future of Russia's border States.
In reply, Pravda published a ' vitriolic outburst' of anger. The article was headed:
"Wilkie Muddies the Water," and described him as " an obedient mouth-
piece repeating the outcries of the reactionary groups who fear the victorious
advance of the Red Army and the armies of the Allies.""" It is time to understand,5*
says the article, " that the Baltic problem is an internal affair of the Soviet Union,
with which Mr. Wilkie must not meddle.
** Whoever is interested in the question had better familiarise himself with the
Soviet constitution and the democratic plebiscite once carried out in the Baltic
.Republics, and remember that we are able effectively to defend our constitution.
As for Finland and Poland, not to mention the Baltic countries, the Soviet Union
can make necessary agreements with those countries, and does not need Mr. Wilkie's